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The creation of a threat image
Media, policy making and organised crime
Petrus C. Van Duyne1
Perception and stimuli competition
There is a strong similarity between the functioning of the media and the adage
of the English philosopher Berkeley: ‘to be is being perceived’ or ‘esse est
percipi’. This subjective approach to being and knowledge has been com-
mented upon ever since (Warnock, 1969). Apart from the philosophical
controversy around the nature of knowledge and reality, perceptions determine
the social and psychological reality to which we respond. This is a truism, but
an important one, because it leads us to the role of the senses, which cannot be
neglected if we intend to describe the social reality in which we live and
interact. This does not only apply to the individual, but equally to a whole
community, which is likewise dependent on ‘eyes and ears’ through which the
stimuli of ‘reality’ enter the collective awareness.
Given the simple fact that we can only observe a small slice of reality,
a significant part of the daily perceptions are determined by other ‘eyes and
ears’, particularly the press and the television. They determine to a large extent
what will be perceived, though not directly. The individual senses differ from
the public eyes and ears, because the latter deliver impressions, which still have
to be ‘bought’ by the end users, the public. This usually entails a highly
competitive selection process with a loss of much information simply because
of limits in space and time. Moreover, if the individual human has a
(protective) capacity to prevent impressions to ‘enter’ the conscience,
impressions handed to him by other actors stand an even higher chance of
being neglected or actively filtered out. In addition to this, there is a multitude
of impression or news offering ‘public eyes and ears’ from which to choose.
The potential large stock of ‘news’, a limited space in terms of paper
and time and the natural selectivity of the news consumers force the ‘news
maker’ to ask himself daily: ‘Will my selection of news reach a sufficient
number of consumers?’ The answer may be determined by a mixture of his
hypothetical image of his news consumers and their feedback in terms of their
buying behaviour. The latter is itself determined by what psychologists call the
stimulus sensitivity: strong and crude news stimuli penetrate stronger and
stimulate better purchasing behaviour than subtle ones. After all, Bin Laden
sells better than a recently detected Rembrandt.
Within this rough and well-known framework, not intended as a
summary of a social psychological theory of the news media, I will describe the
interaction between the media, the agencies of law enforcement (police and
public prosecution) and policy makers concerning the phenomenon of
organised crime. I will focus on the recent history in the Netherlands, when
from about 1986 till 1993 interested parties made every effort to get the
stimulus ‘organised crime’ well above the awareness level of political decision
makers and the public. In 1993/94 a scandal about improper police methods
broke out, which changed the until that moment describable interactions into
a different psychological climate with a hotch-potch of heated accusations,
denunciations and suspicions.
The media seduction of organised crime
Crime, particularly its more violent manifestations, is a stimulus with a high
seductive value to make one shiver and thrill. The organised variety of crime
guarantees even more excitement and sensation, for which reasons it has a
higher seductive potential. This is not merely an abstract proposition, but
something which in a very tangible way directs and maintains the media
attention. The seduction also applies to the harbinger of the organised crime
news items: he is almost always assured of media attention.
Even if this interaction is centuries-old, it remains fascinating to
observe how this mutual seduction hardly ever fails to be effective in creating
2 The following situation was characteristic for the awe with which he was ap-
proached. Senator Curtis asked him about the organised crime in Omaha. Valachi
turned to the official next to him and whispered something. Everybody thought that
the question touched a sensitive point, for which he needed consultation. As a matter
of fact he asked: ‘Where the hell is Ohama?’
long lasting collective memories. The Medieval monks duly copied Bede’s
description of the Great Army (micel here; Blair, 1970) of the many thousands
of Vikings, who threatened the North-sea coasts, while the tonnage of the small
draggers did not even have the transport capacity for such an achievement.
Another example is William the Taciturn, who in his apology accused Philip
II of Spain of having killed his feeble minded son. This has entered the history
as the ‘black legend’. Given this ancient ‘news building’, it would have been
almost a miracle if the reporting of the organised crime issue would have been
carried out with the cool eye of a hypothetical ‘clinical’ observer and processed
by a critical audience.
A short review of the recording history of organised crime in the USA
reveals a fascinating interaction between the media, law enforcement agencies
and the public, which does not differ much from the historical examples
mentioned above. The successive committees on organised crime, either
convened by the Congress or the presidents Nixon, Johnson and Reagan, were
publicity feasts, creating vivid memories of the Cosa Nostra (Abadinsky, 1991;
Von Lampe, 1999, 2001). Important for the ‘image building’ was the testimony
of the organised crime figure Valachi, which made history indeed. This lower
rank soldier of a New York mafia-family, who could hardly look over the fence
of his own neighbourhood, received exorbitant attention. He was considered
the man ‘who really knew’ and every word he spoke obtained the aura of
authority.2 In particular the saga of the so-called ‘Castellammarese War’ in
1931 has acquired an authentic place in history. In this ‘war’, in which the old
mafia boss Maranzano had his rival Masseria killed, after which he was
eliminated himself by the more modern thinking Luciano and his associates,
some 40 other old style mafia figures would have been slain. Nelli (1976) sifted
through all the news papers of September, October and November of that year
and found only three related liquidations in New York. It is uncertain whether
this refutation also got a place in the organised crime history and was
subsequently ‘perceived’ by the public opinion. Two years after this
publication the New York Times still mentioned the historical ‘fact’ of the
Castellammarese war.
More recently Russian organised crime has obtained a high level news
value. Its strength and extent (in the mid-1990s some 8.000 criminal
organizations have been recorded), as well as its supposed threat to Europe and
3 The author experienced a similar persistence in untrue reports, when during the mid-
1990s a press report mentioned that the ‘Russian mafia’ or all kinds of shady Rus-
sians were busy with the acquisition of numerous expensive houses in London and
South England. Directly inquiring with the National Crime Intelligence Service the
author was assured that the purchases were mainly in the lower price ranges. The
question whether this report would be corrected evoked the snappy
answer:‘Certainly not’.
the USA has been enlarged upon. The journalist Claire Sterling topped this
threat by describing an even more sinister scenario: an alliance between the
Russian and Italian mafia, which has been decided during a ‘top summit’ at
Prague in 1992. ‘Delegates’ of the two organised crime syndicates would have
agreed upon a kind of ‘pax mafiosa’, which was revealed by the Head of
Interpol a year later at a police conference in Aruba (Sterling, 1994). It was a
thrilling revelation, which is widely believed. However, Williams (1997)
provided well founded reasons for the absurdity of this proposition: what is the
meaning of ‘delegation’ with such fragmented and mutually warring criminal
organizations; who would speak and act on whose behalf? Such a nuancing is
relatively powerless to the evoked image of the spine-chilling threat of a world
wide octopus of evil, even if (some of) the producers of such news were aware
of its falsity (Rawlinson, 1998). As Rosner (1995) formulated it earlier:
Russian organised crime is sexy and people prefer to hold on to the gruesome
image. A fact based moderating adjustment of such a threat image fall flat or
is explicitly resented and resisted.3
Though these observations do not apply to all those involved and under
all circumstances, the seductiveness of the organised crime theme enhances the
likelihood of keeping or raising the awareness by making the phenomenon
more creepy. On this point the agendas of the politicians, law enforcement
agencies and the media converge. Their shared interest is a big social and law
enforcement problem. One may call them interested ‘problem owners’. On the
one hand there are the law enforcement problem owners, who  –like every
owner– cherish their possession while they tend to enlarge it, certainly not
silently. On the other hand there are the media, which have an interest in selling
newsworthy, i.e. exciting stimuli. This natural interaction around a shared
interest will be elaborated in the next sections.
To seduce and being seduced
The previous section indicated briefly the formation of the image of organised
4 The German debate on organised crime started in 1973. The peaks of the media
coverage went parallel with the debate in the police forces, later followed by some
investigative journalists, like Behr (1985) and Lindlau (1987). According to Von
Lampe (2002) the media also followed the contents of the police representation of
the problem, which contained some degree of mafia connotations, until the BKA
definition of organised crime dropped the classical mafia feature of a criminal hier-
archy, like capos, dons and the like. This may have been less attractive to sell as
‘news’ and the media continued their ‘mafia track’.
crime in the USA. Also in Europe the police, public prosecution and the media
put the supposed phenomenon of organised crime as a threat image on the
political agenda. This happened notably in Germany, the Netherlands,
subsequently in the UK and then the Council of Europe and the European
Union. In the first two countries this happened in the course of the 1980s.
During this phase the initiative was taken by a few worried police chiefs,
whose warnings were met by disbelief. Hence they set themselves the clear task
of convincing the higher echelons of the police, public prosecution, policy
makers and the politicians of the looming threat coming from organised crime
against the society. Subsequently, in the Netherlands as well as in Germany, the
media played an important role in conveying the intended perception to the
public and the political arena.4 
In the Netherlands the debate on organised crime unfolded somewhat
later than in Germany. It was first mentioned in the year 1985 in a policy paper
of the ministry of Justice, ‘Society and crime’, which was about frequently
occurring common crime. A small section was devoted to the importance of
attacking wholesale drug trafficking. Another creator of the organised crime
problem was professor Fijnaut, who on the one hand stated that we did not
know anything about this phenomenon, but on the other hand warned against
its immanent threat (Fijnaut, 1985; 1989). His warnings found little response
at that time.
Under the influence of the prosecutor-general, Gonsalves, and the
Amsterdam police force this would change. Gonsalves, a determined crime-
fighter, became in 1987 the chairman of the ‘task group Gonsalves’, which had
to deal with ‘serious, organised crime’. This task group established a working
group ‘Crime Analysis’, which got the task to make a quantitative national
overview of the phenomenon. This task was carried out in 1988 by the National
Detective Information Service, which sent the local Crime Analysis Units a
questionnaire. In these questionnaires the officers had to rate the crime groups
in their districts according to a number of distinctive features, usually based on
soft information. According to the response there would be some 200 crime
organizations, three of which were rated as ‘highly organised’. The
methodology and the presentation of the organised crime picture were very
5 As a matter of fact, the number of 200 concerned the number of returned question-
naires, which were subsequently presented as crime-groups, which were then asso-
ciatively elevated to organised crime.
6 It was not ‘really’ leaked as the chairman condoned the conveying of the findings
to the media. This was against the opinion of one of his senior prosecutors, who was
the chairwoman of the working group crime analysis during six years. In a conversa-
tion with the author she qualified this ‘leaking’ as misleading, an opinion she also
voiced in an interview with the newspaper NRC-Handelsblad, November, 3, 1993.
That was to no avail.
7 For the Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice this course
of action was embarrassing. It was said that ‘The Research Unit of the police has
won this battle’ and has ‘appropriated this issue’. 
contestable.5 However, a debate on the merits of this survey could not enfold
as the report remained classified, though the contents and conclusions were
immediately leaked to the media and broadcasted at prime time in the 8 o’clock
news.6 The tone was clearly set: we do have a really big organised crime
problem in the Netherlands, against which firm action has to be taken.7 The
tone was amplified by the police as well as by two investigative journalists.
One journalist was permitted by Gonsalves  –against the will of public
prosecutors of the organised crime units– to snoop around in the criminal files
of Turkish heroin wholesalers (Van der Roer, 1989). The focus of attention of
the other journalist as well as of the Amsterdam police was the then Dutch ‘Mr.
Big’, Bruinsma. This was a well-educated intelligent crime-entrepreneur, who
succeeded with brains and violence in conquering a dominating place in the
hash market (Middelburg, 1992). The Amsterdam organised crime unit
produced impressive organization chart of this crime-entrepreneur, which were
presented to numerous top-brass of the police and public prosecution as well
as to parliamentarians. As a matter of fact these presentations contained a
number of errors, which were known to the police at that time. For a sharing
of ‘knowledge’ this misinformation was not considered objectionable.
This elaboration does not support Fijnaut’s claim that the media did not
seriously respond to the issue of organised crime (Fijnaut et al., 1996). The
point at stake was whether there was a sufficiently developed collective threat
image that could be translated into a desired policy approach. The road to such
an approach is usually long, though the initial impetus was already given. For
example, in 1987 the report about the Financial Aspects of Serious Crime had
been issued, in which proposals were made to recover the profits of crime. In
addition, the (erstwhile) chief inspector of the Amsterdam police force saw his
dream come true with the establishment of an inter-district detective unit of 60-
90 officers, which had the prime target of bringing the organised crime figure
8 Using the traditional police methods of surveying and telephone tapping the unit
instead of a more analytical financial approach, the unit performed little. The prob-
lem was solved by the underworld itself: Bruinsma was killed summer 1991.
Bruinsma to justice.8
Obviously, the police did not only want money and large organised
crime units: many detectives hoped for some spectacular incident, which would
induce the public opinion and parliament to pressure for more investigative
powers. From this perspective the notorious kidnapping and murder of the
brother of one of the captains of industry at that time had a disappointing
ending. ‘If that had been carried out by an organization instead of a psychopath,
we would have got everything (investigative powers) in the cupboard’, was a
complaint uttered to the author in the Amsterdam CID.
The seduction of the police towards the policy makers, the media and
the politics did bear fruit. The attention for organised crime increased, a result
to which also the tireless activities of Fijnaut contributed much. For example,
he organised the ‘Dutch-American Conference on Organised Crime’ in 1990,
an event which he himself proclaimed a ‘watershed’ in the way of thinking
about organised crime (Fijnaut and Jacobs, 1991). Nevertheless, irrespective
of the contents of this thinking or the nature of the seduction, there was still no
clear idea of what ‘organised crime’ was supposed to mean. The concept of
organised crime was (and still is) obscure (Van Duyne, 1996; Klerks, 2000;
von Lampe, 2001; Paoli, 2002), which did not prevent the developing of
political driving power to put the organised crime menace on the agenda of
politicians and policy makers and to alert the public.
In connection to this drive the working formula for the public
prosecution and the police to set up special units was ‘heavy/organised’ crime,
the word ‘heavy’ denoting  the crime committed by the traditional violent
underworld, which was also the orientation of the media. This would not
remain without consequence: organised business crime would only receive
attention as organised crime when there was an involvement of ‘heavy’
criminals, the ‘usual suspects’ from the underworld.
If the time span till 1991 can be characterized as the era of seduction,
in which strong measures were taken to arouse attention for this phenomenon,
after the killing of Mr. Big Bruinsma there was no longer any need for
seduction. The public attention had obtained the required impetus of its own
and would reach extraordinary dimensions during the following two years.
Brants and Brants (1996) described 1993 as the climax of this development.
After January 1994 the interaction concerning the presentation of the organised
crime image became obfuscated due to an affair between police units and the
police commissioners of Amsterdam and Utrecht, the so-called IRT-affair.
There were suspicions, jealousy and denunciations between the commissioners,
the minister of Justice and Internal Affairs, the chief public prosecutor of
Amsterdam and the police, until the orgy of organizational and personal fights
led to the dissolution of the special organised crime unit and a Parliamentary
investigation. The elaboration in the following sections will therefore end with
the onset of this affair. It will be based on the press documents of the Ministry
of Justice.
It should be noted that the number of persons involved in the creation
of the image of organised crime was actually very small: just a handful of
reporters who ‘sniffed around’ everywhere to find out whether there were there
were interesting, ‘nice’stories. Also the number of officials was not large, even
if it became slightly larger over the years. A small number of scholars formed
the third party in this ever more intriguing interaction.
The creation of a threat image
Interesting, newsworthy stories do not necessary lead to a contribution in
policy making in the fight against crime. To achieve there must be a threat, a
big one, to the society to get all the parties involved in the same direction and
to overcome resistance. The ‘heavy’ crimes, which are committed in an
organised way, may be serious, but still fail to arouse a real, experienced threat.
To evoke such an experience a fictitious border must be crossed: the border
between upperworld and underworld. However, in this regard there is a chronic
shortage of facts: very few organised crime underworld figures are actually
spotted in the upperworld. As far as the Netherlands are concerned this state
of affairs has not changed (Van Duyne, 2003).
Fortunately there proved to be an almost literally ‘golden’ key to make
the threat story plausible after all: the big crime-money. Despite the absence of
organised crime figures having intruded or being about to penetrate into the
upperworld, the problem-owners could refer to the assumed financial strength
of organised crime. As most people know little about finances and financial
manipulations are shrouded in mystery, the image of wealthy criminals
corrupting greedy politicians and other untrustworthy high mighty people
strongly appeals to the imagination and facilitates the creation of the threat
image. Thus it happened. Whereas the 1987 report on the recovery of the
criminal profits was based on the legal principle of the restoration of justice,
the gathering moral ‘panic’ about the ‘march of organised crime’ to the
9 This is an interesting example of the ‘myth of 10’: the minister of Justice claimed
that of every Dutch ten guilders one would be criminally tainted, the FATF esti-
mated that 10% of the drugs transports is intercepted and that the business costs of
the drug trade is 10%. This number, which is just as cogency as the Old Testament
number of 40, was seriously taken as a starting point for policy making (Van Duyne,
1994,1993). As far as I could determine, the 10% interception rate was first men-
tioned in the 1930s, to be repeated ever since. 
upperworld was based on sheer hypothetical numbers. The Financial Action
Task Force on Money-laundering, established in 1989, played a key role in
fanning this scare. In its report, issued in 1990, the FATF described the
threatening situation the (industrialized) world faced. The turnover of the
worldwide drug trade was estimated at $ 300 billion of which $ 85 billion
would be available for money-laundering in the USA and Europe. Just note the
subjunctive ‘would be’, which was soon interpreted as ‘is’. A year later the
consultancy firm McKinsey, not having any experience on the field of crime
and law enforcement, reported about the safety situation in the Netherlands.
The report estimated that the Dutch turnover of the drug trade, arms trade and
illegal gambling would amount to 10 billion Dutch guilders ( 4,5 billion).9
Though the foundations of what became accepted as ‘facts’ was shamefully
poor, the Leitmotiv was set and the media would time and again go back to it.
The initial amounts of crime-money would obtain its own inflation and increase
to $ 500 billion in 1997 (UNDCP-report). Obviously, with such staggering
amounts of financial ammunition available to ‘highly sophisticated’ criminals,
the threat image was clear: the ‘organised crime marches to the upperworld’
against which the forces of law enforcement had to wage a (preventive) battle
(Heijder and Horbeek, 1991).
One can say that all the conditions for a further development of a threat
were met: there was an interpretation framework, there were problem-owners
and there were criminal ‘data’, which fitted within or could be constructed to
fit within this framework. In addition there were the ‘public eyes and ears’,
which were more than willing to make all this observable to a greedy and
credulous public. It was the right chemic, which in the time span between 1991
and 1994 could lead to a heated atmosphere, in which a number of clear
focusses of interest can be discerned. The first focus of interest concerned the
already mentioned menace to the upperworld posed by organised crime. The
second one was the relative impotence of the police and public prosecution to
do something against this menace. The third focus concerned the ‘mobilisation
of the forces’ of the police and the criminal justice system to win this ‘war’.
10 This was admitted by the police commissioner of the Inter District organised Crime
Squat: ‘The number of 599 has been mentioned to attract political as well as societal
attention to this problem’ . . . ‘While using the figure of ‘599’ all kinds of overlap-
ping criminal cases have been counted as fully fledged organisations’. This admis-
sion of a leading police officer of twisting the facts in such an important policy area
achieved only a tiny little article in an inside page of the local paper Utrechts
Nieuwsblad (December 16, 1992)
The threat image of the underworld
The image of the threatening underworld was reinforced in 1991/92 by a
number of incidents. In the first place a new confidential national organised
crime survey report was  –in an orchestrated way–  again leaked to the press in
September 1991. The methodology was again invalid and the conveyed image
of the organised crime situation misleading. The organised crime situation
would be much worse than in 1988: in that year there would be 200 organised
crime groups, in 1991 the number had increased to 599. Though this was a case
of intentional misinformation and manipulation, which was admitted a year
later10, the false representation had its desired impact. In the parliamentary
debate on the 1992 justice budget the Second Chamber passed a motion
requesting the Minister to draft a policy plan on organised crime. The Minister
responded to this motion by establishing a departmental task group, which had
to draft a broad plan of action. When this task group proved unsuccessful, due
to lack of expertise, the head of the Directorate of Crime Prevention, professor
Van Dijk, was requested to perform this task. Informed by the police, mainly
from cases which were still under investigation and which contained much soft
information, the director succeeded in finalizing a draft policy paper in the
early summer of 1992. To the  dismay of the two responsible Ministers of
Justice and Internal Affairs the draft paper leaked also to the press in June
1992.
In the first six months of this year there was only one news paper
article about the ‘grasp’ of the (organised) crime on the economic system. After
the leak of the memo of the ‘top civil servant’ a wave of ‘grasp-on-the-upper-
world’ articles followed. This was reinforced by the annual report of the
Central Detective Service of the police, which under the headlines ‘Organised
crime thrived in 1991’ or ‘Heavy crime succeeds due to police failures’, got
sufficient media attention. A development of an autonomous mutual
reinforcement had started.
The shocking events in Italy added fuel to the political fire. The
murders of the judges Falcone and Borsellino in the summer of 1992 was
followed by a Europe-wide fear of the Mafia ‘crossing the Alps’. According to
a classified (and leaked) report of the Bundeskriminalamt there were Mafia
connections in Southern Germany, particularly in the pizzeria businesses. Bold
headlines in the Dutch papers stated that ‘the Mafia has no borders’, a warning
seriously adopted by some professors of criminology: Fijnaut, Schmid and Van
Dijk wrote about the worrisome situation or conveyed the great concern in oral
presentations. In September the quality news paper NRC/Handelsblad let loose
in clear headlines: ‘Ministers observe infiltration of the Mafia in the
Netherlands’, ‘Cabinet sees crime surfacing in the legal economy’ and ‘Of
every ten guilder one is criminally tainted’. The later ‘observation’ of
criminologist and director Van Dijk that ‘not the Mafia but the Camorra is
active in the Netherlands’ was a small ‘expert’ correction, but not a great
comfort (NRC/Handelsblad, 26 September).  Two weeks later the popular
Telegraaf mentioned that the ‘Justice professor proclaims the hunt on ‘drug
dollars’ in trade and industry’, in which Van Dijk referred to the dubious
investigations of the FATF and the flimsy report of McKinsey. Even darker
clouds were depicted by the Schmid in his inaugural lecture at Erasmus
University, September 1992 (Schmid, 1992). He depicted the combination of
evil coming from the Mafia, Japan, South American cartels and, the newest
threat, the criminal hordes from the Russian steppes. Against this background
it did not make much impression that the Central Detective Service  repeated
its observation that the Mafia appeared to be unknown in the Netherlands.
In 1993 the media fire about organised crime in the Netherlands and
its menace to the upperworld was fanned now and again. It was telling that the
8 o’clock news added a new icon when an item concerned Dutch organised
crime was broadcasted: a pistol with the bullet-riddled Dutch flag, imitating an
earlier symbol denoting the Italian Mafia. Focus was again on the ‘grab of
organised crime for the upperworld’. First of all the catering business, as far as
the pubs were concerned, was declared to be in the grasp of crime (Telegraaf,
April 24, 1993). Later the Catering Association and some chief commissioner
confirmed this image and stated that it applied to the whole sector: ‘Crime in
all sections of the catering business’ and not only in pubs and snack bars
(Algemeen Dagblad, June 5, 1993). About this time in a closed meeting with
young lawyers, the ‘Justice professor’ Van Dijk mentioned the existence of a
list of the Central Detective Service, which contained ‘at least ten shady
barristers’. Against all agreements this message was published (NRC-
Handelsblad, May, 7, 1993). A storm of protest from the Bar impelled the
minister of Justice to reprimand publicly his top civil servant, who happened
to be absent for a few days. It is doubtful whether this public rebuke could
11 Van Dijk had extracted this information in good faith from the crime-analysis of the
Central Detective Service of 1991. In the questionnaire the crime-analysts had
indicated whether the described crime group ‘had connections’ with juridical profes-
sionals. The response was based on soft information and a national score of ten
‘shady barristers’ (even if based on hard information) can hardly be considered
worrying.
12 The chief commissioner’s remark was a complete blunder. As a matter of fact,
during the author’s investigation he and an inspector came across a barrister, who
had a certain role in the management of enormous amounts of suspect moneys.
Locally he was an important member of the liberal-conservative party. The chief
commissioner could not have known about this case, as the two of us were the only
persons informed. The top brass of the police became nervous and rank and file
detectives were asked ‘whether they happen to know other cases’. Finally, by refer-
ring to this barrister the inspector could safe his boss, who could underpin his irre-
sponsible statements after all (De Volkskrant, November 2, 1993).
correct the reinforce image of the ‘organised crime infiltration’.11
If the supposed handful of louche barristers raised already panic, the
Amsterdam chief commissioner struck even more forcefully home while stating
in a television interview that ‘also within political parties’ wrong relationships
[with organised crime] are feared, though he did not want to become specific.
It could concern a Turk, who might be available for the Party for Labour for a
local representative body, which could become vulnerable to penetration by the
‘Mafia’ or its Turkish variety. Afterwards a conservative liberal was
mentioned.12 This news coverage caused a mixture of concern and indignation.
The Second Chamber demanded in high tones chapter and verse. Van Dijk
(1993) warned again solemnly that ‘the Netherlands are sliding towards an
Italian order’ (Trouw, November, 2, 1993), but fortunately the minister could
declare that as far as the Second Chamber was concerned there was nothing
wrong: ‘Minister: the Chamber is Mafia-free’ (Telegraaf, November 2, 1993).
Even if in this case one could speak of the fanning of a fierce but short
‘media fire’, which was characteristic of the atmosphere of the time, the image
of the threat of our financial institutions re-appeared regularly and is also still
alive today. Given the dynamics of the crime-economy this is understandable.
Crime trade turns around the illegal money, which must be placed or invested
somewhere, if it is not directly consumed on ‘daily needs’. For that matter the
regularly appearing money-laundering cases are quite predictable and generate
time and again news coverage. The threat image which this yielded can best be
summarized by the headline in the Utrecht Nieuwsblad: ‘Society is becoming
a junk of crime-capital’ (May, 21, 1993). Also the stock market would be
‘attractive to criminals’, as was illustrated in the fall of 1993 by a small and
only seemingly successful Amsterdam stockbroker’s firm, which appeared to
have attracted crime-money for investment. As a matter of fact, it proved to be
13 The author came across some (soft) information about one large investment portfolio
(Van Duyne, 1995). Nevertheless, some crime-entrepreneurs do buy stocks and
bonds, but the volume is very modest and concerns conservative investments, similar
to most of the private buyers of shares (Van Duyne, 2003).
14 The case, described in Van Duyne (1996) as the United Pill Peddlers, was big
indeed, but would also be handled by the Belgian police, because of the paper trails
of the purchase and transit of precursors and the required false invoices. 
15 After some time the political pressure resulted in the resignation of the Ministers of
Justice and Interior and a Parliamentarian Investigation. In a second prosecution the
alleged leader of the ‘Delta organization’ was acquitted. 
a costly financial adventure: the broker made the wrong assessments of the
stock exchange trends and went bankrupt, destroying more crime-money than
he laundered. The unfortunate intermediary was found dead in a burnt car.
Thus far this is one of the few substantiated examples of interest from crime-
entrepreneurs for the stock exchange.13
The investigative picture
A threat image can lose its intensity and persuasiveness if it is not reinforced
by new facts and revelations. In addition, law enforcement successes are
important to make clear that ‘we are winning the war’: ‘trophies’ have to be
shown to the people. In this regard some concern developed in 1990/91,
because the biggest anti-organised crime investment thus far, the 60-90
detectives of the inter-district crime squad (nicknamed the ‘bunker team’
because of its social isolation), did not yield the desired results. The mentioned
prime target, hash wholesaler Bruinsma, was not taken in and made a mockery
of the police enterprise. Within the unit the detectives complained that they
could not ‘score’. The depression within the unit did not diminish, when in the
summer of 1991 its target was eliminated by four bullets of a fellow criminal
instead of by the law. As a matter of fact, the murder resulted in a kind of
identity crisis within the squad: it lost its raison d’être, while new criminal
targets, which could meet the criminal criteria of the inter-district squad, did
not present themselves. A large XTC case brought some temporary relief.14 The
identity crisis was subsequently solved by selecting the Bruinsma’s ‘second
man’ as investigative target. He was supposed to lead the so-called ‘Delta-
organization’. Afterwards it proved to be a fateful decision: in the unsuccessful
chase of this ‘Delta-organisation’ secretive, ‘shady’ investigative operations
were applied, resulting January 1994 in its disbandment and subsequent
scandal, as referred to in the second section.15  
16 Described in Van Duyne 1996 as ‘Boris Batterbrain’.
17 The United Pill Peddlers’ attempted investment in used East German railway wag-
gons ( 2,25 million) was not realized, because the lot was not assigned; a sex
lingerie boutique was loss-making. In the end the remaining investments were: two
large sheds for cacao storage in Amsterdam, a Greek lemonade factory (value un-
known) and an Indonesian holiday park for divers. Total value:  2,04 million. The
investment of the gypsies in the catering business was described by an independent
accountant as a loss-making ‘toy for the gentlemen’ (Van Duyne, 1997).
Bruinsma (and his heirs) was not the only target of the organised crime
units. All police districts had made ‘organised crime’ a top priority issue and
many ‘heavy/ organised crime squads’ rounded up crime-organisations, mainly
in the drug trafficking business. Apart from the regular arrests of Turkish
heroin wholesalers, a special task unit of the Hague police arrested one of the
most violent hash wholesalers.16 In February 1992 the above mentioned United
Pill Peddlers were rounded up. With a turnover of  135 million and a net
profit of  45 million they were considered the largest XTC traders ever
arrested. Somewhat later the large investments in the catering business of a
hash smuggler trailer gang was unravelled. The investigation revealed a  4,5
million investment in renown restaurants and pubs, which added to the image
of ‘the catering business in the grasp of organised crime’.
Despite these regular successes, no public image of success was
created. The crime-trade continued as usual. This was explained by the
assumption that above every arrested criminal organiser, there was an even
bigger one, who simply continued the trade, while himself remaining in the
shadow. The representation of the crime-trade as a flat and cluttered delta did
not get adopted (Van Duyne, et al. 1990). Instead a hierarchical delta was
assumed, which was reflected in the representation of the above mentioned
ghostly ‘Delta-organization’. This image, but particularly the vast amounts of
crime-money, which was supposed to be invested in the upperworld (reinforced
by the FATF report) kept the image of the ‘infiltration’ of organised crime in
trade and industry alive.
This image was not very susceptible for corrections based on available
evidence. The data of the criminal files of the United Pill Peddlers or the
investing gypsies mentioned above showed that their upperworld investments
were smaller than reported in the press. As a matter of fact the investments
were shallow, unprofessional and loss-making, a finding which hardly affected
the prevailing image.17 The simple reason for this omission was that this
information did not reach the ‘media senses’: the police and the public
prosecution did not bring it to the attention. And even if these facts were
known, the reporters were busy with other news items and did not have the
interest nor ‘editorial space’ for such nuancing. More editorial space was
devoted to some sensational escapes from prison (among others of one of the
leading Colombian cartel members Londoño, January 1992); the many
prosecutorial technicalities and mistakes by the public prosecution during the
trial of the United Pill Peddlers; the complaint of the head of the Central
Detective Service that ‘the fight against organised crime hardly gets started’ or
the mishap of the Dutch Telecom, which failed to include in its ‘*21’
forwarding system a provision to tap the connected telephone number. This
was not interpreted as a management failure, but as evidence that ‘criminals are
outsmarting the police’ (Volkskrant, July, 11, 1992). A year later the head of
the Central Detective Service complained again that ‘it will certainly take three
years before the police will be able to turn the tide’ [of organised crime], a
remark which contradicted other more optimistic views in the same interview.
Mobilisation
Amidst all the news coverage about the ‘marching of organised crime’, reports
were made about the efforts of the police and the public prosecution to stem
this ‘advance’. This does not only concern the exploits of the inter-district
organised crime squad (against Bruinsma and his heirs), but rather the various
announcements like ‘The police unifies against big crime’ (Volkskrant,
February 17, 1992), proclamations which have been repeated in the
Netherlands as well as abroad. A first token of the ‘closing of the ranks’ is the
decision of the police forces of the big cities in the west of the Netherlands
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague) to unite in ‘one front’, which would
later become layed down in a memo called the ‘Randstadnotitie’. Following the
mafia-killings of the two Italian judges also a ‘ruthless EU-offensive’ against
the Mafia was proclaimed. After these proclamations and some attention for the
establishment of the new institution EUROPOL, it remained quiet for a while,
at any rate in the media. Meanwhile  the preparations for the extension of inter-
district organised crime squads progressed steadily.
In February 1993 the first of a series of ‘super police’ and ‘tough
approach’ reports was published (Telegraaf, February, 20, 1993). The coming
into force of the Law on the Recovery of Proceeds (nicknamed the Pluck-them
law), spring 1993, provided additional material to underline the ‘tough
approach’. The Amsterdam police force invented an approach of its own in the
form of so-called a ‘harassment team’ to sour the lives of the high level
criminals: clamping down on every little transgression they committed
18 The term ‘Deltaplan’ means originally the large system of dikes in the Zealand
estuaries against the danger of large scale inundations, as happened in February
1953. Figuratively it can mean a huge (defensive) work against a some social wrong.
Apparently the prosecutor-general used to think in terms of ‘delta-dimensions’.
(Telegraaf, March, 6, 1993). Whether this genius brainwave made any impact
on the crime-market, history does not tell. All we know are the police raids on
the exchange offices (operation Golden Calf), which were broadcasted life on
television. Actually, this was a ‘harassment’ to the (usually silently operating)
Fiscal Police in the first place, who were unwillingly dragged into the show.
Otherwise the success remained limited to the prosecution of the less important
criminals, the actual money-changers. However, due to a too hasty drive for
visible success the money-trail to the really important depositors of the many
millions of Euros could not be followed.
Apart from this side show for the media (and the Amsterdam commis-
sioner’s ego), the implementation of a new coherent law enforcement approach
proved to be a matter of the organisationally patience of a saint, which
reinforced the image of the impotence of the police: ‘Plans for combating crime
hardly executed’(Het Parool, June 7, 1993). This does not mean that the top
echelons of the police had lost its fighting spirit. During a police conference of
130 countries October 1993 on the Caribbean island Aruba (also much
favoured by criminals and their launderers), the three chief commissioners of
Amsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam told the interviewer of the Telegraaf
of ‘giving a deathblow to the big mafia-like organisations in our country’. Two
weeks later the minister of Justice repeated, somewhat more subtle, but in a
similar bellicose tone to ‘deliver the decisive battle . . . . for the control of our
society’. In the same month the prosecutor-general Gonsalves stated that ‘the
whole society has to be mobilised for a kind of ‘Deltaplan’ against organised
crime, which is advancing in high speed (AD, October 23, 1993).18
It looks like an irony of history that at the time of Gonsalves’
reflexions on his ‘deltaplans’ against organised crime, another ‘delta’, namely
the alleged Delta crime-organisation and the responsible crime-squad would
turn the whole criminal policy and the law enforcement agencies involved into
the previously mentioned mudflow of quarrels and imputations (Middelburg
and Van Es, 1994).
Policy making and image building
The previous sections described how a small number of leading officers of the
19 In this regard it may be considered remarkable that the multi billion scam of the
criminal duo Parretti and Fiorini, who operated in the Netherlands with two corpora-
tions quoted on the stock exchange, only received the silent attention of the Dutch
Central Bank. That did not prevent them from acquiring a large interest in cinemas,
skimming the Bank Crédit Lyonnais Neerlandais for billions of guilders, before
going bankrupt in the megalomaniac plans in the American film industry (d’Aubert,
1993). No prosecutor ever considered an investigation by an organised crime squad.
police, the public prosecution, the ministry of Justice and reporters and editors
in the media kept the issue of organised crime in the public attention, set the
tone and saw to it that the drive wheel kept momentum and weight. As happens
so often with social forces, the driving wheel obtained its own acceleration and
angle of orientation, pushing everything aside which did not fit into its course.
As remarked above, the basic orientation was already indicated by the
commission Gonsalves in 1987. It fitted in the rough mental image of The
Organised Crime, as a matter of fact encompassing all ‘heavy’ crime committed
by the illiterate lower class ‘underworld’ figures, with all the usual
connotations of primitive brute violence, corruption and other heinous actions
(Van Duyne, 1994; 1996). Large scale economic business crime was not felt
to be a part of this scene.19 To what extent this perspective of ‘Heavy Crime’
directed the media-senses became clear, when the author cooperated in two
television programmes. The first concerned the ‘increasing’ rate of criminal
‘settlements’: the mutual liquidations in the milieu. My view that violence in
the crime trade as a ‘business tool’ is rude and unpractical, generating evidence
and informants, and that it indicates rather weak than strong organizations, was
cut out, because the editors thought it ‘too scholarly’. It would not fit in an
entertaining programme on organised crime. At the second occasion, a Nova
broadcast intended to show ‘how serious the situation is’, I pointed at the multi
billion business of organised VAT and excise fraud schemes. This did not fit
in their representation of seriousness. The assistant had to consult his editor,
then phoned again several times, desperately urging me every time stronger to
mention ‘more serious cases’ than the merely multi billion organised business
crime. ‘Is there really nothing more serious?’ In the end the whole news item
was cancelled (fall, 1992).
The political reception of the previously mentioned organised crime
memorandum of the Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs, presented to the
Second Chamber in September 1992, illustrates the social psychological
climate, which had developed at that time. In the opinion of the conservative
Liberal and Christian parties the ministers did not go far enough. Only the
Democrats and the Socialist Party showed some reserves concerning the
required extension of the investigative powers of the police. This restraint did
20 In the Dutch political relationships their roles are usually inverse: the Liberals use
to stress low and order, favouring more police powers, while the Socialists show
more restraints.
not last long. In the following six months the reserves had changed completely
to the opposite. The debate of the permanent Chamber Commission for Justice
at March, 23, 1993, which the author attended, made a heated and excited
impression. As a matter of fact it was a sorrow display of little knowledge and
much simplistic screaming-headlines-thinking: ‘the organised crime is
marching and so is corruption, society is being threatened’ and similar
exclamations dominated the debate. In the general call for a tough approach the
Social Democratic Party even excelled the conservative Liberals, which led to
the concerned reaction of a liberal spokesman, that ‘there is the danger that the
Socialists overreact and that it is our turn to pull the brake’, because the rights
and freedoms of the citizens are being jeopardized (Het Parool, March, 23,
1993).20 Hence, the memorandum, (a ‘weak piece’, over which ‘heavy crime
is not going to lose any sleep’) did not go far enough and the minister of Justice
–who was in the opinion of his civil servants already a bit too energetic–  was
urged to do even more.
It is not surprising that among policy makers in the ministry of Justice
there was hardly any susceptibility left for other, deviating perspectives. The
only empirical research project carried out thus far, approaching organised
crime from the angle of crime-entrepreneurs, did not fit into the created
atmosphere of threat images (Van Duyne et al. 1990). Comments on the flaws
in the alleged professionalism of crime-entrepreneurs or the need to develop a
criminal market policy fell on deaf ears compared to the emphasis on the
threatening advance of the Mafia made by mainstream scholars (Fijnaut et al.,
1996). At first there was the fear for the open borders between the so-called
Schengen-countries (1992). At a conference in Maastricht Fijnaut announced
that he had ‘indications that the Mafia attempted to take over power in Western
Europe’. Though the Mafia did not arrive, this image remained in the public
conscience. After the killings of Falcone and Borsellino, he repeated his
warnings: the Mafia was already in Belgium, near Liège and it was a matter of
time before she would cross the rivers (Fijnaut, 1993). The similar apocalyptic
mood, was expressed by Schmid (1992), warning against all sorts of Russian
criminal hordes.
September 1992 at a symposium on organised crime at the Erasmus
University, Rotterdam, the author gave a presentation of the history of the
organised crime image building, which he compared with the way mutually
copying monks created the image of the ‘big’ Viking invasions during the ninth
21 In an interview with the author Van Dijk remembered that the police presentations
were characterized by an ‘atmosphere of national menace in which one is easily
considered a collaborator [of organised crime], a kind of quisling’.
and tenth century. This lecture was published as a news paper article beginning
December 1992 with a cartoon of the threatening Viking longships (Van
Duyne, 1993). Only three years later did I learn the reaction which this
publication evoked, when one of the directors of the ministery conveyed to me
that ‘of course we do not talk with you anymore when you publish such an
article  after our memorandum’. Open-mindedness to other opinions or holding
a debate on matters of contents concerning this high priority subject had
actually stopped and had yielded to a form of group-think, which sets clear
boundaries  to the mental horizon of policy makers and politicians. The eyes
and ears of the media, policy making and politics were tightly directed to the
one socially correct direction and produced only one common perception of
seriousness. Most mainstream scholars carefully remained within this socially
accepted framework.
The long shadows of an image
Historical ‘insight’ is hindsight. With what hindsight should we evaluate the
interaction between the media, policy making and the politics? The finding that
this issue with such a high degree of stimulus value has been very liable to
steering and manipulation cannot be considered a real revelation: that would
be the case if the opposite would hold true. However, not all the players in the
field were intentionally steering the media. I never established a systematic
steering or even something like a mutual tuning between the actors at policy
making level. Their clumsiness of later dealings with the media during another
little scandal makes such an assumption very implausible. At the level of the
police there was a clear manipulation in the sense that the reports about the
organised crime situation clearly violated the truth. Truthfulness had been
replaced by purposiveness, aimed at continuously putting the organised crime
issue on the political agenda, silencing all classical civil rights objections
against the demand for more investigative powers, repressive legislation and
money.21 A conservative Liberal member of the Second Chamber, Korthals
(later to become Minister of Justice), remarked that the political brakes against
the increasing power of justice (police and public prosecution) were clearly
worn through. Few felt that way and even fewer dared to express such feelings.
The aims of the agencies of law enforcement have been reached. The
legislation against organised crime gained momentum and critical comments
on the increase of the state power are rarely heard of. Even when the legislation
goes step by step into the direction of the reversal of the onus of proof,
politicians as well as scholars appear to accept this development in a resigned
mood. This is particularly the case in the area of money-laundering (Schalken,
1999; Van Duyne and Van der Landen, 1999), more accurately criminal
financial management, recently enriched by terrorist financing (Levy, 2003).
Though the Mafia and other organised crime scares have abated in the
media for the time being, the law enforcement agencies and politicians still
beat the same drum nationally as well as in the international fora. At Tampere
(Finland, 1998) the European Council of elevated organised crime to a
European priority, while at the level of the United Nations ‘great steps forward’
have been made by the convention against organised crime, which was
ceremoniously and with much parrot-like rhetoric adopted in December 2000
at Palermo. These events do not imply that the threat image has faded away. As
a matter of fact, the new attribute ‘transnational’ has been added and accepted
by the UN as a new threat: transnational organised crime. Given the simple
economic circumstance that since time immemorial the traffic of most illegal
commodities implies the crossing of border, it is difficult to understand the
added value of the adjective ‘transnational’. Nevertheless, an elaborate official
policy making theatre developed around this new fuzzy concept, being
proclaimed a new threat, which fount its countermeasure in the UN Convention
against Transnational Organised Crime in 1999, defined in art. 3 (Mitsilegas,
2003; Shepticky, 2003).  
Also in the area of money-laundering the FATF still succeeds in
evoking the ‘fear’ of a criminal infiltration of the financial upperworld and its
ensuing corruption. It should be noted that this ‘fear’ is a highly artificial and
ritual matter, having nothing to do with any existentially experienced fear or
observed states of affairs. These old FATF threat images continue to function
as the mantras of prayer mills and have in that capacity more impact on the
legislator than any knowledge of facts and figures. Nevertheless this mumbling
of the money-laundering mantras seems to be sufficient to overcome any
resistance against proposals for tighter regulations against the ‘menace’ of
laundering. In the previous section I mentioned already that the anti-laundering
laws tend to reverse the onus of proof, while in the cases of a reflexive
application they have technically already crossed the line of self-incrimination
(Van Duyne, 2003), which appears to be taken for granted.
More than fifteen years have passed since the onset, or rather the
orchestration of the organised crime scare in the Netherlands as well as in other
countries of the EU. To what extent was this fanning of fear (the police call this
22 This cannot be said of some of the production countries of drugs, like Turkey,
Morocco or Colombia. The return money of the drug sales did contribute to some
economic changes, which were not all favourable to the economic and social stabil-
ity of the receiving countries (De Mas, 2001; Verbeek, 2001).
‘raising the awareness’) justified by the facts which were known or the reports
that were available at that time and which parts of the threat thesis have been
proven correct? Summarizing the findings of the empirical research projects in
Europe since 1988, we have to come to the following conclusion: 
1. there was at that time no empirical foundation for the intensity of the
threat image;
2. hardly any component of the threat image appeared to be valid.
The landscape of the crime-entrepreneurs was and still is a flat, shifty network-
shaped trading ‘delta’ of prohibited services and goods or licit services and
goods offered cheaply due to fraud and deceit. That has been the main picture
in Western Europe even since. Paoli (2002) argues that this concerns mainly
commercial, trading types of organised crime, while the consolidated organised
crime groups (like in Italy) have achieved a high degree of permanence due to
their reliance on non-economic ties, for example familial bondage or ethnic
relationships. The permanency of these groups does not necessarily imply a
dominance of the illegal markets or a menace beyond their original reach. If
these mafia-like groups enter the prohibited substances markets, they have to
operate under similar constraints as the more flexible and ephemeral
commercial entrepreneurial organizations, operating in flexible networks. This
picture of flexible network organisations was already made public by the
German research in 1988 (Rebscher and Vahlenkamp, 1988) and by the first
and second research projects of the Dutch ministry of Justice (Van Duyne,
1990; 1995), to be confirmed (or rather, represented as ‘new’) by later research
of the same ministry (Kleemans et al., 1998). Also the dreaded infiltration or
penetration of the underworld into the upperworld due to the amassed crime-
moneys yields the same picture as fifteen years ago. Despite all the
investigations and the clear demonstrations that the illegal markets generate
staggering profits, any strategic criminal economic planning and conduct have
not been uncovered (Van Duyne, 1997, 2003). Even in such favoured economic
areas as catering and real estate, the investment of crime-moneys (after
laundering) does not reflect an economic strategy or far reaching aims to obtain
a social and economic bridgehead in society (Van Duyne, 2003).22 In short:
even if the existence of large amounts of crime-money and the wealth of some
successful crime-entrepreneurs is morally embarrassing, evidence of its
menacing disruptive and corruptive impact in the industrialized world is scarce
23 In its report to the Senate (1910) the special commission raised the impression of a
real drug epidemic, with estimates of 1.000.000 drug addicts, though Courtwright
(1982, p. 29) demonstrated that the most plausible estimate was around 100.000
between 1919 and 1940. The rapporteurs appeared to be well aware of this false
representation. Once taken for true, the imaginary figures continued to scare legisla-
tors into action. It would not be the last fraud in the drug policy portfolio: the mari-
juana scare (the ‘killer weed’) was equally based on deception (Himmelstein, 1983).
and usually restricted to (organised) business crime-entrepreneurs. However,
in these fraud cases the angle of attention shifts to the upperworld and its
materialistic values, which appears to have much in common with the
underworld. It should be noted that all the big corruption cases in Western
Europe in the last twenty years concerned licit moneys from legal, respectable
corporations (like Agusta, Dassault) to leading political figures. However, that
is not a threat image, but a sickness image. This sickness may attract the media
attention for a while, as scandals have a good selling potential as well, but the
interactive mechanism to create a continuous moral panic and to maintain the
momentum of a law enforcement warlike  pressure lacks an important
component: the elite itself.
Conclusion
This article began with the thesis that ‘to be is being observed’ and the
importance of the ‘public eyes and ears’ in this regard. This is no revolutionary
revelation. More important than this ‘old truth’ is the point of abusing the
generated fear to increase the powers of state and to erode the willingness to
weigh the requirement of ‘organised crime’ reduction against the maintenance
of civil rights. This is not very new either. The history of the development of
the awareness making of organised crime in America reveals a similar fear
mongering, though mixed with national characteristics like xenophobia and
outright racism. No public figure and only a few scholars dared to challenge the
prevalent representation of the organised crime image, leading to what
Woodiwiss (2001) called the ‘dumbing’ of the discourse. The history of the
drug prohibition policy shows the same pattern of generating fear by fraud and
deceit for legislative purposes right from the beginning of the anti-drug policy
(Courtwright, 1982; Bruun, 1975).23 This recurrent pattern does not make the
pernicious consequences less grave. As a matter of fact, the long shadows of
the threat images still make themselves felt, even if Europe has not come in the
grasp of the Mafia and the Russian criminal hordes did not arrive. These
‘visible’ images have been reinforced by the image of an even more creepy,
24 Naylor refers to the reaction of a senior UN officer, responsible for the original
laundering estimates, whose was queries critically about its accuracy. Embarrassed
he insisted in the end that the figure of $ 500 million dollars was useful for capturing
the public attention.
because stealthy, infiltration of the big crime-money, which requires new
legislative inroads to keep society safe against organised crime. Given the
attitude and zeal of the interested law enforcement agencies, like the Financial
Intelligence Units, this carry-over of the original menace to a derivative can be
considered an understandable, rational organizational policy, which may not
be too worrying. What is worrying, however, is the relative docility of jurists
and politicians, still under the long shadow of the old organised crime images,
insensitive to the more detailed and differentiated empirical findings or even
displaying plain arrogance (Naylor, 1997).24 This may lead to a biassed policy
development without proper counterweights.
References
Abadinsky, H., Organised crime. Chicago, Nelson-Hall, 1991
d’Aubert, F., L’argent sale. Enquête sur un krach rententissant. Parijs, Plon,
1993
Behr, H-G, Organisiertes Verbrechen. Düsseldorf, ECON Verlag, 1985
Blair, P.H., In introduction to Anglo-saxon England. Cambridge, University
Press, 1970
Brants, Ch. and K. Brants, Van Italiaanse tot Marokkaanse toestanden. De
media en het criminologisch onderzoek naar de georganiseerde
criminaliteit. Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, 1996, no. 2, 120-143
Bruun, K., L. Pan and I. Rexed, The gentlemen’s club. International control of
drugs and alcohol. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1975
Courtwright, D.T., Dark paradise; opiate addiction in America before 1940.
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982
De Mas, P., De poreuze noordkust van Marokko. Justitiële Verkenningen,
2001, no. 5, 72-86
Dijk, J.J.M. van, De gelegenheid maakt de mafia (ook in Nederland). Neder-
lands Juristenblad. 1993, no. 86, 1337-1342
Duyne, P.C. van, Money-laundering: fears and facts. In: P.C. van Duyne, K.
von Lampe, M. Aronoff and M. Scheinost (eds.), Criminal finances
and organising crime in Europe. Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers,
2003
Duyne, P.C. van, Organised crime, corruption and power. Crime, Law and
Social Change, 1997, no. 26, 201-238
Duyne, P.C. van, Definitie en kompaswerking. In: C. Fijnaut, F. Bovenkerk, G.
Bruinsma and H.G. van de Bunt (eds.), De georganiseerde criminali-
teit in Nederland. Arnhem, Gouda Quint, 1996
Duyne, P.C. van, Het spook en de dreiging van de georganiseerde misdaad.
Den Haag, SDU-uitgeverij, 1995
Duyne, P.C, van, Money-laundering; estimates in fog, The Journal of Asset
Protection and Financial Crime, 1994, no. 1, 58-76
Duyne, P.C. van, Geld witwassen: omvangschatting in nevelslierten. In: P.C.
van Duyne, J.M. Reijntjes and C.D. Schaap (reds.), Misdaadgeld.
Arnhem, Gouda Quint, 1993
Duyne, P.C. van, De Vikingen komen.  De openbare beeldvorming rondom de
georganiseerde misdaad. In: Georganiseerde misdaad. Een nieuwe
bedreiging voor de samenleving. Verslag van een symposium 20
november 1992. Erasmus Universiteit. Leiden, LISWO, 1993
Duyne, P.C. van, R.F. Kouwenberg and G. Romeijn, Misdaadondernemingen.
Ondernemende misdadigers in Nederland. Arnhem, Gouda Quint, 1990
Duyne, P.C. van, H. De Miranda and T. Peeman, Verdacht en doorgemeld.
Een statistisch overzicht van drie jaar verdachte geldhandelingen.
Zoetermeer, KLPD-DCRI, 1999
Duyne, P.C. van and H. De Miranda, The emporor’s cloths of disclosure: hot
money and suspect disclosures. Crime, Law and  Social Change, 1999,
no. 2, 245-271
Duyne, P.C. van and D. van der Landen, De kennelijke herkomst van sneeuwitje.
De nieuwe witwaswet en het ‘goede verhaal’. Nederlands Juristenblad,
1999, no. 35, 1683-1688
Economic and social consequenses of drug abuse and illicit trafficking. Wenen,
UNDCP Technical Series, 1997
Fijnaut, C.J.C.F., De Maffia in Nederland. Delikt en Delinkwent, 1993, no.
7, 617-620
Fijnaut, C.J.C.F., (ed.) Georganiseerde misdaad en strafrechtelijk politiebeleid.
Lochem, J.B. van den Brink, 1989
Fijnaut, C.J.C.F., Georganiseerde misdaad. Een onderzoeksgericht terreinverken
ning. Justitiële Verkenningen, 1985, no. 9, 5-42
Fijnaut, C.J.C.F., F. Bovenkerk, G.J.N. Bruinsma and H.G. van de Bunt.
Eindrapport georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland. Arnhem, Gouda
Quint, 1996
Fijnaut, C. and J. Jacobs (eds.), Organised crime and its containment. A
transatlantic initiative. Deventer, Kluwer, 1991
Heijder, A. and F.H. Horbeek, Gezamenlijke inspanning nodig in de strijd tegen
‘witwassen’. Algemeen Politieblad, 1991, no. 23, 11-14
Himmelstein, J.L., The strange career of marijuana: politics and ideology of
drug control in America. Westport, Greenwood, 1983
Kleemans, E., E.A.I.M. van den Berg and H.G. van de Bunt, Georganiseerde
criminaliteit in Nederland. Rapportage op basis van de WODC-monitor.
Den Haag, Ministerie van Justitie, 1998
Klerks, P.P.H.M., Groot in de hasj. Theorie en praktijk van de georganiseerde
misdaad. Rotterdam, Samsom bv, 2000
Lampe, K. von, Organised Crime: Begriff und Theorie organisierter Kriminalität
in den USA, Frankfurt/Main, Lang, 1999
Lampe, K. von, Not a process of enlightenment: the conceptual history of
organised crime in Germany and the United States of America. Forum
on Crime and Society, 2001, no. 2, 99-116
Levi, M., Following the criminal and terrorist money trails. In: P.C. van Duyne,
K. von Lampe and J.L. Newell (eds.), Criminal finances and organising
crime in Europe. Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2003
Lindlau, D., Der Mob. Recherchen zum organisiertem Verbrechen. Hamburg,
Hofmann und Campe, 1987
Middelburg, B., De dominee. Opkomst en ondergang van mafiabaas Klaas
Bruinsma. Amsterdam, Uitgeverij L.J. Veen, 1992
Middelburg, B. and K. Van Es, Operatie Delta. Hoe de drugsmafia het IRT
opblies. Amsterdam, Uitgeverij L.J. Veen, 1994
Mitsilegas, V., From national to global, from empirical to legal: the ambivalent
concept of transnational organised crime. In: M.E. Beare (ed.), Critical
reflections on transnational organised crime, money laundering and
corruption. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2003
Naylor, R.T., Mafias, myths and markets: on the theory and practice of enterprise
crime. Transnational Organised Crime, 1997, no. 3, 1-45
Nelli, H.S., The business of crime. New York, Oxford University Press, 1976
Paoli, L., The paradoxes of organised crime. Crime, Law and Social Change,
2002, no. 1, 51-97
Rawlinson, P., Mafia, media and myth: representations of Russian organised
crime. The Howard Journal, 1998, no. 4, 346-358
Rebscher E. and W. Vahlenkamp, Organisierte Kriminalität in der Bundesrepu
blik Deutschland. Wiesbaden, BKA-Forschungsreihe, 1988
Roer, R. Van der, Criminele organisaties: vijf journalistieke beschouwingen.
In: Fijnaut, C.J.C.F., (ed.) Georganiseerde misdaad en strafrechtelijk
politiebeleid. Lochem, J.B. van den Brink, 1989
Rosner, L.S., The sexy Russian mafia. Criminal Organizations, 1995, no. 1,
17-23
Schalken, T.M., Toekomstige wetgeving in zake witwassen: over oude en nieuwe
bezwaren. Delikt en Delinkwent, 1999, no. 4. 287-310
Schmid, A., Smerige zaken: de opkomst van de onderwereld. Rede uitgesproken
bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van bijzonder hoogleraar. September,
1992
Sheptycki, J., Against transnational organised crime. In: M.E. Beare (ed.),
Critical reflections on transnational organised crime, money laundering
and corruption. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2003
Sterling, C., Thieves world. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994
Verbeek, N., De baronnen van de cocaïne. Amstelveen, Zaak de Haas, 2001
Warnock, G.J., Berkeley. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969
Williams, Ph., Introduction: How serious a threat is Russian organised Crime.
In: Williams (ed.), Russian organised crime. The new threat. London, Fran
Cass, 1997
Woodiwiss, M., Organized crime and American power. Toronto, University
of Toronto Press, 2001
